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OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE
We identify six kinds of emerging software life cycle challeng-
es that we have observed within the U.S. Defense community as 
they have moved to OA systems for C2 that integrate, operate 
and maintain contemporary OSS and CSS components. These 
challenges follow from our ongoing efforts within the Defense 
community that build on and refine our previous efforts in this 
area, [14,15] and point to areas of practice requiring further 
software engineering (SE) research.
Unknown or Unclear OA System Representations
This first kind of challenge arises when acquiring new or 
retrofitting legacy software systems that lack an open or explicit 
architectural representation. Such a representation should iden-
tify and model major software system components, interfaces, 
interconnections and remote services (if any). Though OA refer-
ence models are in use within the SE research community, con-
temporary C2 generally lack such descriptions or representa-
tions that are open, sharable, or reusable. This may be the result 
of legacy contractor business practices that see software archi-
tectures as proprietary intellectual property (IP), even when OSS 
components are included or when applications’ subsystems are 
entirely made of OSS code. An alternative explanation reveals 
that complex software systems like common web browsers 
(Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome, Apple Safari, Microsoft Edge) 
have complex architectures that integrate millions of SLOC that 
are not well understood and that entail dozens of independently 
developed software elements with complex APIs and IP licenses 
that shift across versions. [12] This implies the effort to produce 
an explicit OA reference model is itself a daunting task of archi-
tectural discovery, restructuring, and continual software evolu-
tion. [5, 7] Thus, new ways and means for extracting software 
components, interconnections, and interfaces and transforming 
them into higher-level architectural representations are needed.
Heterogeneously licensed OA systems
OSS components are subject to widely varying copyright 
licenses, end-user license agreements, digital civil rights, and 
other IP protections. The Open Source Institute recognizes 
dozens of OSS licenses that are in use, though the top 10 
represent more than 90 percent of the open source ecosystem. 
[9] This is especially true for OSS components or application
systems that incorporate source code from multiple independent
OSS development projects, such as those found in contempo-
rary web browsers like Firefox and Chrome that incorporate
components from dozens of OSS projects, most with diverse
licenses. [12] This means that OSS application systems are sub-
ject to complex software IP obligations and rights that may defy
tracking or entail contradictory obligations/rights. [1] Determin-
ing overall IP obligations for such systems is generally beyond
the scope of expertise for software developers, as well as most
corporate lawyers. Furthermore, we have observed many ways
in which IP licenses interact within an OA software system, such
that different architectural design choices that configure a fixed
set of software components result in different overall system ob-
ligations and rights. Understanding multiple license interactions
and IP mismatches is far too confusing for most people and a
source of legal expense or, alternatively, expensive indemnifica-
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Introduction
There is growing interest within the Defense community in 
transitioning to acquiring complex, cybersecure open architec-
ture (OA) software systems within an agile and adaptive eco-
system. [8, 10, 11, 14, 15]. In such a world, proprietary closed 
source (CSS) or open source software (OSS) components may 
be acquired from alternative software producers or system inte-
grators across the system life cycle. This is envisioned to enable 
more competition and, ideally, lower costs and increase the qual-
ity of software elements that arise from a competitive market-
place. [8] But this adaptive agility to mix, match, reuse, mashup, 
swap, or reconfigure integrated systems or components requires 
that systems be compatible with, or designed to utilize, an OA 
— a software representation that identifies component types, 
component interconnections, and open APIs. [14]
The common core of cybersecure OA command and control 
(C2) systems resembles many enterprise business systems, as 
C2 are a kind of management information system for navigat-
ing, mapping, and tracking resources; scheduling people and 
other resources; producing plans and documentation; and 
supporting online email, voice or video communications. Figure 
1 depicts an OA representation for this kind of system. This 
OA representation can be read as a “reference model” for a C2 
software product line. But there is an emerging set of software 
engineering research and practice issues that arise and affect 
the development of new C2 systems, especially when CSS and 
OSS components are combined into an integrated system.
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Figure 1. An OA reference model for common software component types  
interconnected within an integrated, cybersecure C2 system. [14]
tion insurance policies, for the software producers or system in-
tegrators. Nonetheless, in our view, OA software ecosystems are 
defined, delimited, and populated with niches that locate specific 
integrated system solutions. [12] Furthermore, we see that 
these niches effectively have virtual IP licenses that must be 
calculated via the obligations and rights that propagated across 
integrated system component licenses via union, intersection, 
and subsumption relations among them. [4] Such calculation is 
daunting, and begs for a simpler, tractable, and computationally 
enforced scheme that can scale to large systems composed 
of many components. In such a scheme, OSS/CSS licenses 
could formalize IP obligations as operational requirements (i.e., 
computationally enforceable) at the integrated system level and 
instantiated by system integration architects. Similarly, custom-
er/user rights are then nonfunctional requirements that can be 
realized and validated as access/update capabilities propagated 
across the integrated system. [3]
Cybersecurity for OA systems
Cybersecurity is a high priority requirement in all C2 sys-
tems, applications, and platforms. [14] No longer is cyberse-
curity something to be addressed after C2 are developed and 
deployed — cybersecurity must be considered throughout the 
design, development, deployment and evolution of C2. However, 
the best ways and means for addressing cybersecurity require-
ments are unclear, and oftentimes somewhat at odds with one 
another depending on whether cybersecurity capability de-
signs are specific to the: C2 platform (e.g., operating system or 
processor virtualization; utilization of low-level operating system 
access control or capability mechanisms); component producer 
(secure programming practices and verification testing); system 
integrator (e.g., via the use of secure data communications 
protocols and data encryption); customer deployment setting 
(mobile: airborne or ship-board; fixed: offices, briefing rooms, 
operations centers); end-user authentication mechanisms; or 
acquisition policy (e.g., reliance on third-party audit, certifica-
tion, assurance of system cybersecurity). However, in reviewing 
these different arenas of cybersecurity, we have found that the 
cybersecurity requirements or capabilities can be expressed 
in much the same way as IP licenses: using concise, testable 
formal expressions of obligations and rights. Some suggestive 
examples follow (capital letters are placeholders that denote 
specified system, service, or component contexts).
—The obligation for a user to verify her authority to invoke 
application software and access data in compartment T, by 
password check or other specified authentication process.
—The obligation for all components connected to specified 
component C to grant it the capability to read and update 
data in compartment T.
—The obligation to reconfigure a system in response to detect-
ed threats, when given the right to select and include different 
component versions, or executable component variants.
—The right to read and update data in compartment T using 
the licensed component C.
—The right to replace component C with a certified secure 
component D.
These examples show how cybersecurity requirements can 
be expressed or paraphrased into/from restricted natural lan-
guage (e.g. using a domain-specific language) into composite 
specifications that denote “security licenses.” [1, 2, 14] In this 
way, it should be possible to develop new software analysis 
tools whose purpose is to interpret cybersecurity obligations 
as operational constraints (executable) or provided capabili-
ties (access control or update privileges) through mechanisms 
analogous to those used for analyzing software licenses [1, 4, 
14], and to determine how component or subsystem-specific 
obligations and rights can be propagated across a system’s 
architecture. Consequently, we believe that cybersecurity can 
therefore in the future be addressed using explicit, computa-
tional OA representations that are attributed with both IP and 
cybersecurity obligations and rights.
Build, Release and Deployment (BRD) Processes 
and Process Automation
C2 applications represent complex software systems that are 
often challenging to produce and maintain, especially when initially 
conceived as bespoke systems. To no surprise, acquisition of these 
systems requires a development life cycle approach, though some 
system elements may be fully formed components that are opera-
tional as packaged software (e.g., commercial database manage-
ment systems, web browsers, web servers, user interface develop-
ment kits/frameworks). C2 system development is infrequently 
clean-sheet and even less likely to be so in the future. As a result, 
component-based system development approaches are expected 
to dominate. This implies system integrators (or even end users) 
must perform any residual source code development, inter-app 
integration scripting, or intra-app extension script development. But 
software process challenges arise along the way. [13]
First, as noted earlier, the issue of whether there is an explicit, 
open source OA design representation — preferably one that is 
not just a diagram but is instead expressed in a computational 
architectural design language. With only a diagram or less, there 
is little or no guidance for how to determine whether/how an op-
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erational software implementation is verifiable or compliant with its 
OA requirements or acquisition policies. Current acquisition policy 
guidance calls for provision or utilization of standardized, open APIs 
intended to increase software reuse, selection of components from 
alternative producers, and post-deployment system extensions. [8]
Second, there is the issue arising from system development 
practices based on utilization of software components, inte-
grated subsystems, or turn-key application packages. These 
software elements come with their own, possibly unknown 
requirements that are nonetheless believed to exist and be 
knowable with additional effort. [3] They also come with either 
OSS code or CSS executables, along with their respective APIs. 
These components must be configured to align with the OA 
specification. Consequently, software tool chains or workflow 
automation pipelines are utilized to build and package internal/
external executable, version-controlled operational software 
releases. We have found that many diverse automated soft-
ware process pipelines are used across and sometimes within 
software integration activities. [13] These pipelines take in OSS 
code files, dependent libraries, or repositories (e.g., GitHub) and 
build executable version instances that are then subjected to 
automated testing regimes ranging from simple “smoke tests” 
to extensive regression testing. Successful builds eventually 
turn into packaged releases that may or may not be externally 
distributed and deployed as ready-to-install executables. While 
this all seems modest and tractable, when one sees the dozens 
of different OSS tools used in different combinations across 
different target platforms, it becomes clear that what is simple 
in the small becomes a complex operations and maintenance 
activity when the scale of deployment increases.
Another complication that is now beginning to be recognized 
within and across BRD processes and process automation 
pipelines arises in determining when and how different BRD tool 
chain versions/configurations can mediate cybersecurity require-
ments in the target system being built or maintained. For instance, 
many software system builds and deployed releases are assumed 
to integrate to functionally equivalent CSS components. However, 
many CSS components are not included in distribution releases 
due to IP restrictions and thus must be linked and configured into 
already deployed operational systems. We have also observed and 
reported how functionally equivalent variants as well as function-
ally similar versions may or may not be produced by BRD tool 
chains, either by choice or by unintentional consequence. This, 
in our opinion, gives rise to the need for explicit open source mod-
els of BRD process automation pipelines that can be analyzed, 
reused, and shared, as well as systematically tested to determine 
whether release versions/variants can be verified and/or vali-
dated to produce equivalent or similar releases that preserve prior 
cybersecurity obligations and usage rights.
Software Evolution Practices Transmitted Across 
the OA Ecosystem
Software evolution is among the most-studied of SE process-
es. While often labeled as “software maintenance,” a frequently 
profitable activity mediated through maintenance contracts from 
software producers to customers, the world of OSS develop-
ment projects and practices suggest a transition to a world of 
continuous software development — one that foreshadows the 
emergence of continuous SE processes or software life cycles 
that just keep cycling until interest in the software falters or 
spins off into other projects. OSS development projects rely on 
OSS tools that themselves are subject to ongoing development, 
improvement, and extension, as are the software platforms, 
libraries, code-sharing repositories, and end-user applications 
utilized by OSS developers to support their development work. 
The migration of developers within/across OSS projects further 
diversifies the continuous development of the most success-
ful and widely used OSS components/apps. This dynamism in 
turn produces many ways for OSS systems, or OA systems that 
incorporate OSS components, to evolve.
Figure 2 portrays different software evolution patterns, paths, 
and practices we have observed arising with new C2 appli-
cations. [12] Here we see paths from a currently deployed, 
operational software system release to a new deployed release 
update — something most of us now accept as routine, as soft-
ware updates are propagated across the Internet from produc-
ers, through integrators, to customers and end users. 
Integrated OA systems can evolve through upgrades of 
functionally equivalent component variants (patches) as well as 
through substitution of functionally similar software components 
sourced from other producers or integrators. In Figure 3, we show 
a generic situation that entails identifying how an OA consistent 
with that depicted in Figure 1 may accommodate the substitution 
and replacement of a locally installed word processor application 
program (like Microsoft Word) by a remote web-based word pro-
cessing software service (for example, Google Docs or Microsoft 
Office 365). Also note how the software IP licenses compose 
across the four similar release instances shown. 
This capability is a result of utilizing an OA that constitutes a 
reference model aligned with a vendor-neutral software product 
Figure 2. Different paths and mechanisms through which currently operational 
OA software system components can evolve. [12]
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Figure 3. Alternative configurations of integrated instance releases of compo-
nents and IP licenses consistent with the OA in Figure 1 that are treated as 
functionally similar by customer organizations. 
line. This is also a capability sought by customer organizations, 
and sometimes encouraged by software producers to accommo-
date their evolving business models (discussed below). While the 
OA remains constant, the location of the component has moved 
from local to remote/virtual, as has its evolutionary path. Similarly, 
the propagation of IP and cybersecurity requirements for the local 
versus remote component has changed in ways that are unclear 
and entail a different, evolved assurance scheme.
Overall, the evolutions of software components, component 
licenses, component interconnects and interconnected com-
ponent configurations are now issues that call for SE research 
efforts to help make such patterns, paths, and practices more 
transparent, tractable, manageable, and scalable within an OA 
software ecosystem, as well as for customer organizations that 
seek the benefits of openness, sharing and reuse.
New Business Models for Ongoing Acquisition of 
Software Components and Apps
The last issue we address is the newest in this set of six for 
consideration for new SE research. While SE research and prac-
tice has long paid attention to software economics, the chal-
lenges of software cost estimation are evolving in light of new 
business models being put into practice by software producers 
and system integrators.
In the past, system development projects were often managed 
by a single contractor responsible for both software produc-
tion and system integration. Costs could be assessed through 
augmentation of internal business accounting practices (e.g., bud-
geting, staffing workloads, time sheet reports, project schedules, 
fixed fees, etc.). But a move to OA ecosystems means that mul-
tiple producers can participate, and OA schemes accommodate 
switching among providers while a system is being integrated, 
deployed, or evolved in the field. This in turn coincides with new 
ways and means to electronically distribute software updates, 
components, or applications as well as new ways to charge for 
software. For example, OSS components may be acquired and 
distributed at “no cost,” but their integration and evolution charged 
as a service subscription or as time-effort billings.
We have already seen other alternatives for costing, paying for, 
or charging for software that include franchising; free component, 
paid service/support fees; enterprise licensing; metered usage; 
advertising supported; subscription; federated reciprocity for 
shared development; collaborative buying; donation; sponsorship; 
government-provided free/open source software (e.g., Govern-
ment OSS – GOSS); and others. So how are customer organi-
zations, especially in the Defense community where software 
cost estimation practices are routine, suppose to estimate the 
development or sustaining costs of the software components or 
integrated systems they acquire and evolve? How are software 
costs to be estimated when an OA system allows for producers 
whose components come with different costing/billing schemes? 
This is an open problem for SE research in industry practice.
The last piece of the puzzle we are studying is the envisioned 
transition within the Defense community to C2 systemsw being 
composed by customer organizations, and possibly extended by 
end users deployed in the field. This is the concept that surrounds 
the transition to discovering and acquiring software components, 
apps, or widgets in Defense community app stores. [6] These app 
stores are modeled after those popularized for use in distributing 
and acquiring software apps for web-based or mobile devices, 
like those operated by Apple, Google, Microsoft, and others. 
How the availability of such Defense community app stores will 
transform the way C2 systems are produced and maintained — or 
even whether they will be produced by legacy Defense industry 
contractors — remains to be seen. Said differently, how app stores 
transform OA software ecosystem networks, business models, or 
cybersecurity practices is an emerging challenge for SE research.
Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper, we have focused attention on software engi-
neering research challenges that are emerging in the Defense 
community. Much of the earlier research and advances in SE 
emerged from challenges in this same community 40 to 50 
years ago. Most contemporary SE research has moved away 
from this community. However, as we sought to describe in this 
paper, this community is again surfacing and facing a growing 
myriad of issues and challenges that can directly benefit from 
targeted advances in SE research and practice.
We identified and examined six target areas for SE research 
that now plague the Defense community, and perhaps other 
industries and other government agencies as well. All of these 
SE research areas are readily approachable, and research re-
sults are likely to have significant practical value, both within the 
Defense community and beyond.
These issue areas were investigated and addressed in the 
domain of command and control systems (C2). We believe all 
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these issues are tractable, yet dense and sufficient for both 
deep, sustained research study and also for applied research in 
search of near-term to mid-term practical results.
In related work [15], we call for specific R&D investments into 
the development of open source, domain-specific languages for 
specifying open architecture representations (or architectural de-
scription languages, “ADLs”) that are formalizable and computation-
al, and for supporting annotations for software license obligations 
and rights. While ADLs have been explored in the SE research 
community, the challenges of how software architectures mediate 
software component licenses and cybersecurity requirements is 
an open issue with practical consequence. Similarly, ADL annota-
tions that incorporate IP and cybersecurity requirements, along with 
costs or cost models in line with new software business models, is 
an open problem area. We have also called for R&D investment in 
new SE tools or support environments whose purpose is to provide 
automated analysis and support of OA systems’ IP and cybersecu-
rity obligations and rights as new requirements for large-scale soft-
ware acquisition, design, development, deployment and evolution. 
Such environments are the automated tools that could be used to 
model, specify, and analyze dynamically configurable, component-
based OA software systems expressed using the open source 
architectural representation schemes, or ADLs, noted here. We 
hope this paper serves to help throw light into these otherwise dark 
corners of SE research that can inform and add benefit to software 
development practices for C2 and enterprise business systems for 
use and evolution throughout the Defense community.
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